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1 Introduction 
Mobile wireless ad hoc networks have wide applications in 
military operations, rescue missions and scientific explorations, 
where there are usually no network infrastructure support and 
the adversary may intercept, modify, and/or partially interrupt 
the communication. In such applications, security becomes a 
critical concern. Key distribution and subsequent key updating 
are cornerstones for secure communication in such networks. 
The life of such communication network is usually partitioned 
into short time-periods called sessions. A group manager 
generates and distributes a session key to the users in the 
communication group at initialisation stage. All data broadcast 
within the group should be encrypted with the session key so 
  
that only authorised users with session key can access the 
messages. The session key must be updated with sessions upon 
each membership change for secure communication. 
The traditional approaches for key distribution and group 
re-keying used for reliable network are not suitable for large 
and dynamic wireless networks. Key distribution over reliable 
channels requires strong infrastructure such as wired network 
and a lot of bandwidth for delivering data punctually to 
destination. Key distribution over unreliable channels confronts 
more constraints and challenges. Key distribution messages  
can be delayed when they are delivered and some messages 
might never reach to some authorised users. Request or re-
transmission between individual users and the group manager 
in a large group will induce much communication overhead 
and make the group manager heavily burdened. These are 
infeasible in many multi-media distribution systems that are 
based on a uni-directional broadcast distribution channel 
(Safavi-Naini and Wang, 2000; Naor et al., 2001; Perrig et al., 
2001; Gada et al., 2004; Vasudevan and Sanyal, 2004).  
Self-healing key distribution is a potential candidate to 
establish session keys for secure communication to large and 
dynamic groups in highly mobile, volatile and potentially 
hostile wireless networks, where frequent membership 
changes may be necessary and the ability to revoke users 
during certain exchanges is desirable. In such situations the 
session keys need to be used for a short time-period or need 
to be updated frequently. Self-healing is a good property for 
key distribution in wireless mobile and ad hoc networks, 
where the nodes/devices are powered by batteries and have 
the unique feature of moving in and out of range frequently. 
There might be situations where some users are not 
constantly online or experience burst packet losses. It can 
rejoin the group once the power is on again. All these 
factors can take great advantage from self-healing key 
distribution schemes with revocation capability. 
1.1 Self-healing key distribution 
The main concept of self-healing key distribution schemes is 
that users, in a large and dynamic group communication over 
an unreliable network, can recover lost session keys on their 
own, even if they have lost some previous key distribution 
messages, without requesting additional transmissions from 
the group manager. This reduces network traffic and the risk 
of user exposure through traffic analysis and alleviates the 
burden on the group manager. The key idea of self-healing 
key distribution schemes is to broadcast information that is 
useful information only to trusted members. Combined with 
users’ pre-distributed secrets, this broadcast information 
enables a trusted member to reconstruct a shared key. 
However, a revoked member is unable to infer useful 
information from the broadcast. The only requirement that a 
user must satisfy to recover the lost keys through self-healing 
is its membership in the group both before and after the 
sessions in which the broadcast packet containing the key is 
sent. A user who has been offline for some period is able to 
recover the lost session keys immediately after coming back 
online. Thus the self-healing approach to key distribution is 
stateless.  
1.2 Related work 
Broadcast encryption is a closely related area which has 
received much attention from both the network and 
cryptography community. Efficient key distribution and key 
management mechanisms are at the core of this. The area of 
broadcast encryption was formally defined by Fiat and Naor 
(1994) after the work of Berkovit (1991) and has been 
extensively studied since then. A number of approaches have 
been proposed: re-keying schemes for dynamic groups, 
broadcast schemes with tracing capability, users revocation 
from a predefined subset of users etc. A few of them are by 
Abraham et al. (2004), Blundo et al. (1993), Dal et al. (2008), 
Dey et al. (2007), Just et al. (1994), Tiwari et al. (2007). 
However, the underlying networks are assumed to be reliable 
in all the above works. Self-healing key distribution schemes 
are introduced by Staddon et al. (2002). They provide formal 
definitions and security notions that are later generalised by 
Liu et al. (2003) and Blundo et al. (2004). Staddon et al. 
(2002) discuss lower bounds on the resources required on the 
schemes and design some constructions. The constructions 
given by Staddon et al. (2002) suffer from high storage and 
communication overhead. Liu et al. (2003) introduce a novel 
personal key distribution scheme and by combining it with 
the self-healing technique in the work of Staddon et al. 
(2002), they propose new constructions that improve the 
storage and communication overhead greatly. They provide 
two techniques that allow a trade-off between the broadcast 
size and the recoverability of lost session keys. These two 
methods further reduce the broadcast message size – one in 
the case where there are frequent but short-term disruptions of 
communication and the other in the case where there are 
long-term but infrequent disruptions of communication. 
Following these pioneering works, a number of self-healing 
key distribution approaches are proposed (Blundo et al., 
1996; Staddon et al., 2002; Liu et al., 2003; More et al., 2003; 
Saez, 2004; Hong and Kang, 2005; Saez, 2005) to achieve 
unconditional security in formal generalised model with 
improved efficiency. Blundo et al. (2004) show an attack to 
the first construction by Staddon et al. (2002) and develop a 
new self-healing technique different from Staddon et al. 
(2002) under a slightly modified framework. They present a 
new mechanism for implementing the self-healing approach, 
extend the self-healing approach to key distribution and 
propose a scheme which enables a user to recover all keys 
associated with the sessions in which it is member of the 
communication group from a single broadcast message. 
Blundo et al. (2004) analyse the definitions proposed by 
Staddon et al. (2002) and Liu et al. (2003) and show that 
some of the security requirements stated therein, cannot be 
achieved by any protocol. They propose a new definition of 
self-healing key distribution and propose constructions that 
are proven to be secure in that new security framework. 
Subsequently, they provide some lower bounds on the 
resources required for implementing such schemes and prove 
that some of the bounds are tight. Hong and Kang (2005) 
propose self-healing key distribution constructions having 
less storage and communication complexity. More et al. 
(2003) use a sliding window to correct the inconsistent 
robustness in Staddon et al. (2002). 
   
Further improvements in efficiency are obtained by 
relaxing the security slightly – from unconditional to 
computational (Zhang et al., 2003; Zou and Dai, 2006; Dutta 
et al., 2007; Jiang et al., 2007; Kausar et al., 2007; Dutta  
et al., 2009). The schemes (Saez, 2004; Saez, 2005; Tian  
et al., 2008) are based on vector space access structure instead 
of Shamir’s (1979) secret sharing. The hash chain based 
schemes (Dutta et al., 2007; Jiang et al., 2007; Kausar et al., 
2007) are computationally secure and are highly efficient 
compared to the existing unconditionally secure schemes. 
However, these hash chain based constructions have the fatal 
defect of not being collusion resistant in the sense that the 
collusion between newly joined users and the revoked users 
are able to recover all the session keys which they are not 
entitled to. Among the collusion resistance self-healing key 
distribution schemes (e.g. Blundo et al., 2004; Saez, 2004; 
Saez, 2005; Tian and He, 2008; Tian et al., 2008) only by 
Tian et al. (2008) is hash chain based and uses the same self-
healing mechanism as introduced by Dutta et al. (2007). 
1.3 Our contribution 
Security, efficiency and scalability are three major evaluation 
measurements for self-healing key distribution schemes. 
Besides forward secrecy and backward secrecy, collusion 
resistance property needs to be addressed. Collusion attacks are 
dangerous to wireless network key distribution schemes as 
some members of wireless networks may be revoked regularly. 
From efficiency point of view, reducing communication 
overhead is a main concern as energy consumed for 
computation much depends on algorithm and hardware, and is 
order of magnitude less than that required for communication 
(Carman et al., 2000). Also it is required to give consideration 
to the resource-limited property of nodes while designing 
protocols for wireless networks. Scalability is another issue as 
the wireless network may scale up to thousands of nodes and 
operations are required to finish in a timely manner despite of 
frequent change of node topology and density. 
We address the problem of introducing collusion resistance 
property to the self-healing key distribution scheme proposed 
by Dutta et al. (2008). Collusion attacks would cause serious 
damages to key distribution schemes as some users of wireless 
networks may be revoked regularly. We use vector space secret 
sharing together with one-way hash function. Vector space 
secret sharing helps to realise general monotone decreasing 
access structure for the family of subsets of users that can be 
revoked instead of a threshold one. One way hash chain 
contributes to reduce communication overheads. In our design, 
a user is assigned a pre-arranged life cycle by the group 
manager during user’s set-up phase and is revoked once its life 
cycle finishes. 
We achieve the following unique features in our designs 
as compared to the existing similar schemes: 
a Our scheme is anti-collusive in the sense that it can 
resist collusion between the newly joined users and the 
revoked users, together with forward and backward 
secrecy. 
b Our scheme realises a flexible access structure and 
achieves scalability. 
c Our scheme allows revoked users to rejoin in later 
sessions with new identities, while this rejoining is 
prohibited for most of the existing hash chain based 
self-healing key distribution schemes. 
d Our scheme is communicationally more efficient than the 
existing schemes as history of revoked users is not sent as 
part of the broadcast message. Also storage overhead is 
less as compared to the previous constructions. 
A user may get compromised and need a rapid revocation from 
the group by the group manager. Thus the group manager has 
to keep track of compromised users using some traitor tracing 
algorithm, which might be expensive. In our setting, the group 
manager pre-selects the session of revocation for a user during 
user’s set-up phase by assigning the user a pre-arranged life 
cycle. The user is revoked from the system by the group 
manager once its life cycle is over irrespective of user gets 
compromised or not. The joining session can be selected by the 
user. Our designs allow a revoked user to join at a later session 
with new identity and a new life cycle starting from its new 
joining session. The group manager believes that a user 
behaves honestly and will not get compromised during its life 
cycle. Therefore, there is no need for the group manager to use 
expensive traitor tracing algorithms in handling compromised 
nodes. The selection of a user’s life cycle is completely 
determined by the group manager. 
Assigning each user a pre-arranged life cycle by the group 
manager and not allowing the user to revoke before its life 
cycle completes, has natural appeal in many applications. Several 
innovative business models allow contractual subscription or 
rental by the service provider for the scalability of business and 
do not allow the user to get revoked before his contract is 
terminated. Our scheme is suitable for such applications. 
Moreover, rejoining of revoked users can be done in our scheme 
at later sessions with new identities without compromising 
security, unlike the existing self-healing schemes. 
2 Preliminaries 
We begin by explaining key distribution problem and self-
healing property, following it provide definition of one-way 
function and generalised secret sharing schemes using 
access structures, and finally we briefly define the security 
model for self-healing key distribution. The following 
notations are used throughout the paper (Table 1).  
2.1 Key distribution and self-healing 
Consider the scenario which has a set-up for pay-per-view  
TV channel. Suppose 1{ , , }nU U…  is a dynamically changing 
group of users (clients) and 1{ , , }nGM U U∉ …  is the group 
manager (the cable operator). The problem is how the GM 
can securely communicate with its dynamically changing 
group of clients over an insecure broadcast channel, so that 
only authorised clients (who pay) may view the content 
broadcast by the GM. The GM encrypts the content using a 
session key. We need a mechanism of distributing this session 
key in such a way that only the authorised users can recover 
this session key and decrypt the encrypted content. This 
  
mechanism is referred to as the key distribution problem. Our 
goal is to minimise the overhead for this key distribution 
keeping the following issues in mind: (a) group re-keying  
is needed on each membership change; (b) depending on 
specific nature of applications, we can adopt periodic group 
re-keying; (c) efficient and secure revocation as well as 
joining mechanisms are required for dynamic groups etc. 
On top of this, Ui may get offline for some time due to 
power failure and may need to recover lost session keys 
immediately after being online. Self-healing property enables 
qualified users to recover lost session keys on their own, 
without requesting additional transmission from the GM. 
Table 1 Notations used in the paper 
U Set of all users in the networks 
Ui i-th user 
GM Group Manager 
n Total number of users in the network 
m Total number of sessions 
t The maximum number of compromised user 
Fq A field of order q 
Si Personal secret of user Ui 
SKj Session key generated by the GM in session j 
Bj Broadcast message by the GM during session j 
Zi,j The information learned by Ui through Bj and Si
Rj The set of all revoked users in session j 
H A cryptographically secure one-way function 
SB Backward key seed generated by the GM 
B
iK  i-th backward key in the backward key chain  
2.2 One-way function 
Our constructions for self-healing key distribution are based on 
the intractability of one-way function. Informally speaking,  
a one-way function :f A B→  satisfies the following two 
properties where A and B are two finite set: (a) f is easy to 
compute; and (b) f–1 is hard to invert, i.e. it is difficult to  
get x from f(x). See Goldreich (2001) for a formal definition of 
one-way function. An important component of our system  
is a cryptographically secure one way Hash function. The 
underlying principle here is that we must have a measure of the 
difficulty of reversing such functions. More formally a function 
:H A B→  is a cryptographically secure hash function if it 
satisfies the following requirements:  
• H can be applied to any size input and produce a fixed 
length output.  
• H is easy to compute.  
• H has the one-way property, i.e. Given H(x) it is 
computationally infeasible to find x.  
• H is weak collision resistant, i.e. Given x it is 
computationally infeasible to find y x≠  with H(y) = H(x). 
• H is strong collision resistant, i.e. it is computationally 
infeasible to find a distinct pair ( , )x y  with H(x) = H(y).  
In what follows A and B are ( )GF q . As the hash function 
landscape is constantly changing we do not specify a particular 
algorithm to compute H, but note that our construction is not 
dependent on a particular hash function. 
2.3 Cryptographically Secure Pseudo Random Bit 
Generators (CSPRBG) 
Our system requires a good supply of ‘random’ numbers. In 
most practical environments the generation of random 
numbers is inefficient and the storage and distribution of the 
resulting random numbers is impractical. In such situations 
random number generators are replaced by Pseudo Random 
Number Generators (PRNG). Also without loss of generality 
we can consider Pseudo Random Bit Generators (PRBG). A 
PRBG is a deterministic algorithm that inputs a random 
binary sequence called a seed and outputs a longer binary 
stream that appears random. The resulting sequence is not 
random but can be tested in order to gauge predictability. 
One such test is the next-bit test. A PRBG is said to pass 
the next-bit test if there is no polynomial time algorithm 
which, on input of the first l bits of an output sequence s, 
can predict the (l+1))th bit of s with probability greater than 
0.5. A PRBG that passes this test, possibly under a plausible 
security assumption such as the discrete log problem, is 
referred to as a Cryptographically Secure Pseudo random bit 
Generator (CSPRBG). 
2.4 Secret sharing schemes 
In this section we define secret sharing schemes which play 
an important role in distributed cryptography.  
Definition 1 (Access Structure): Let 1= { , , }nU U…U  be a set 
of participants. A collection 2Γ ⊆ U  is monotone if B∈Γ  and 
B C⊆ ⊆ U  imply C∈Γ . An access structure is a monotone 
collection Γ  of non-empty subsets of U, i.e. 2 \{ }Γ ⊆ ∅U . The 
sets in Γ  are called the authorised sets. A set B is called 
minimal set of Γ  if B∈Γ , and for every C B⊂ , C B≠ , it 
holds that C∉Γ . The set of minimal authorised subsets of Γ  
is denoted by 0Γ  and is called the basis of Γ . Since Γ  
consists of all subsets of U that are supersets of a subset in the 
basis 0Γ , Γ  is determined uniquely as a function of 0Γ . More 
formally, we have 0= { : , }.C B C BΓ ⊆ ⊆ ∈ΓU  We say that 
Γ  is the closure of 0Γ  and write 0= ( ).clΓ Γ  The family of 
non-authorised subsets = 2 \Γ ΓU  is monotone decreasing, 
that is, if C∈Γ  and B C⊆ ⊆ U , then B∈Γ . The family of  
non-authorised subsets Γ  is determined by the collection of 
maximal non-authorised subsets 0Γ . 
Example: In case of a ( , )t n -threshold access structure, the 
basis consists of all subsets of (exactly) t participants, i.e. 
= { :| | }B B tΓ ⊆ ≥U  and 0 = { :| |= }B B tΓ ⊆ U . 
Definition 2 (Secret Sharing): Let K be a finite set of 
secrets, where 2≥K . An n-party secret sharing scheme Π  
with secret domain K is a randomised mapping from K to a 
  
set of n-tuples 1 2 n× × ×…S S S , where Si is called the share 
domain of iU ∈U . A dealer D∉U  distributes a secret 
K ∈K  according to Π  by first sampling a vector of shares 
1( , , )ns s…  from ( )KΠ , and then privately communicating 
each share si to the party Ui. We say that Π  realises an 
access structure 2Γ ⊆ U  if the following two requirements 
hold: 
Correctness: The secret K can be reconstructed by any 
authorised subset of parties. That is, for any subset B∈Γ  
(where 
1 | |
= { , , }i i BB U U… ), there exists a reconstruction 
function 
1 | |
:B i i BRec × × →…S S K  such that for every K ∈K , 
[ ( ( ) ) = ] = 1,B BProb Rec K KΠ  where ( )BKΠ  denotes the 
restriction of ( )KΠ  to its B-entries. 
Privacy: Every unauthorised subset cannot learn anything 
about the secret (in the information theoretic sense) from 
their shares. Formally, for any subset C∉Γ , for every two 
secrets 1 2,K K ∈K , and for every possible shares i U Cis ∈〈 〉 , 
1 2[ ( ) = ] = [ ( ) = ].C i U C C i U Ci iProb K s Prob K s∈ ∈Π 〈 〉 Π 〈 〉   
The above correctness and privacy requirements capture 
the strict notion of perfect secret sharing, which is the one 
most commonly referred in the secret sharing literature. 
Next we define the class of linear secret sharing schemes. 
There are several equivalent definitions for these schemes 
(Beimel, 1996), we provide the following. 
Definition 3 (Linear Secret Sharing): Let F be a field. A 
secret sharing scheme Π  is said to be linear over F if: (1) 
The secret domain K is a subset of F. (2) There exists 
d1,…,dn such that each share domain Si is a subset of the 
vector space diF . (3) The randomised mapping Π  can be 
computed as follows. First, the dealer D∉U  chooses 
independent random variables, denoted by 1, , lr r… , each 
uniformly distributed over F. Then, each coordinate of each 
of the n shares is obtained by taking a linear combination of 
1, , lr r…  and the secret K ∈K . 
We are interested in a special case of linear secret 
sharing scheme, namely vector space secret sharing scheme 
that will be described shortly. 
Definition 4 (Vector Space Access Structure): Suppose Γ  is 
an access structure, and let ( )lqZ  denote the vector space 
of all l-tuples over qZ , where q is prime and 2l ≥ . Suppose 
there exists a function : { } ( )lqD ZΦ ∪ →U  which satisfies 
the property: B∈Γ  if and only if the vector ( )DΦ  can be 
expressed as a linear combination of the vectors in the set 
{ ( ) : }i iU U BΦ ∈ . An access structure Γ  is said to be a 
vector space access structure if it can be defined in the 
above way. 
We now present vector space secret sharing scheme that 
was introduced by Brickell (1983). 
• Initialisation: For 1 i n≤ ≤ , D gives the vector 
( ) ( )li qU ZΦ ∈  to iU . These vectors are public. 
• Share Distribution: 
1 Suppose D wants to share a key qK Z∈ . D 
secretly chooses (independently at random) 1l −  
elements 2 , , la a…  from Zq. 
2 For 1 i n≤ ≤ , D computes = . ( )i is v UΦ , where 
2= ( , , , ) ( )
l
l qv K a a Z∈… .  
3 For 1 i n≤ ≤ , D gives the share is  to iU . 
• Key Recovery: Let B be an authorised subset, B∈Γ . 
Then  
{ : }
( ) = ( )i i
i U Bi
D U
∈
Φ Λ Φ∑  
for some i qZΛ ∈ . In order to recover the secret K, the 
participants of B pool their shares and computes 
{ : }
=i ii U Bi
s∈ Λ∑  
( ){ : } { : }. ( ) = . ( ) = . ( ) = mod .i i i ii U B i U Bi iv U v U v D K q∈ ∈Λ Φ Λ Φ Φ∑ ∑  
Thus when an authorised subset of participants B∈Γ  
pool their shares, they can determine the value K. On the 
other hand, one can show that if an unauthorised subset 
B∉Γ  pool their shares, they can determine nothing about 
the value of K (see Brickell, 1983 for proof). 
Example 1: Shamir’s ( , )t n -threshold scheme can be seen 
as a special case of the vector space secret sharing  
scheme, if >q n , by defining =l t  and choosing 
2 1( ) = (1, , , , )ti i i iU x x x
−Φ …  for 1 i n≤ ≤ , where ix  is the x-
coordinate given to iU . The resulting scheme is equivalent 
to the Shamir’s scheme. 
Example 2: Another example of vector space secret sharing 
concerns access structures that have as a basis a collection of 
pairs of participants that forms a complete multipartite graph. 
A graph = ( , )G V E  is called a complete multipartite graph if 
the vertex set V can be partitioned into subsets 1, , dV V…  such 
that { , }x y E∈  if and only if ix V∈ , iy V∈ , where i j≠ . The 
sets iV  are called parts. The complete multipartite graph is 
denoted by , ,1n ndK …  if | |= ,1i iV n i d≤ ≤ . When 1 2= = = =1dn n n" , 
we get the complete multipartite graph 1, ,1K …  (with d parts) 
which is in fact a complete graph and is denoted by dK . It can 
be shown that there exists an ideal scheme realising the access 
structure ( )cl E  (closure of E) on participant set V by choosing 
distinct elements 1, , dx x…  of qZ , where q d≥ , defining 
= 2l  and choosing ( ) = ( ,1)iU xΦ  for every participant 
iU V∈ . 
Example 3: Consider bipartite access structures which are 
first presented in Padro and Saez (2000). In such a 
structure Γ , there is a partition of the set of participants, 
= X Y∪U , such that all participants in the same class 
play an equivalent role in the structure. Any subset A⊂ U  
is assigned with the point of non-negative integers  
( ) = ( ( ), ( )) ,A x A y A Z Zπ + +∈ ×  
  
where ( ) =| |, ( ) =| |x A A X y A A Y∩ ∩  and the structure to a 
region:  
( ) = { ( ) : } .A A Z Zπ π + +Γ ∈Γ ⊂ ×  
To be precise, let n′  be the total number of possible real users. 
Consider a set = X Y∪U , where ={1, , , 1, , 1}X n n n t j′ ′ ′+ + − −… …  
contains the n′  possible real users and 1t j− −  dummy users, 
and = { , , 1}Y n t j n t′ ′+ − + −…  contains j dummy users. So 
the set U contains = 1n n t′ + −  users. Let us consider the 
following bipartite access structure Γ  defined in = X Y∪U . 
={ :| | 1A X Y A jΓ ⊂ ∪ ≥ +  and | | 1} { :| | },A Y A X Y A Z t∩ ≥ ∪ ⊂ ∪ ∩ ≥  
which corresponds to the following region. ( ) =π Γ  
{( , ) : ( )  ( 1  1)}.x y Z Z x t or x y j and y+ +∈ × ≥ + ≥ + ≥  The 
maximal non-authorised subsets in this structure are defined by 
points ( 1,0), ( 1,1), ( 2,2), , (1, 1), (0, ).t j j j j− − − −…  Note 
that non-authorised subsets of a ( , )t n -threshold structure are 
defined by 1t −  users. This bipartite access structure Γ  cannot 
be realised by a vector space secret sharing scheme (except in 
the threshold case = 1j t −  (see Padro and Saez, 2000 for the 
details), but by a linear one in which each participant is 
associated with two vectors instead of one. Therefore, each 
operation will have twice the cost for the same operation in the 
threshold case. 
Vector space secret sharing scheme is a particular case 
of linear secret sharing scheme, but where every participant 
can be associated with more than one vector. Any access 
structure Γ  can be realised by a linear secret sharing 
scheme (Simmons et al., 1991). 
2.5 Security model 
There are two categories of attacks against the existing self-
healing key distribution schemes: outside attack and inside 
attack. The attack launched by users who never participated 
in the communication group is referred to as the outside 
attack. The outside attacks are prevented by means of some 
hardware techniques (e.g. tamper resistance) so that the 
attacker cannot get personal key from a captured/compromised 
node. On the contrary, the inside attack is launched by users 
who ever or will be authorised members of a communication  
group. However, additional security measures should be 
provided for the group manager to block the intruders from 
compromising the group manager. 
As to the inside attack, we consider an attack scenario 
where adversary can compromise more than one user. There 
are three different scenarios to define adversarial goals 
depending on their degree of severity. In the first scenario, 
revoked users collude to acquire the subsequent session 
keys after they are revoked from the authorised group. 
Another severe attack is when new users collude to acquire 
the past session keys before they join the communication 
group. The most severe attack is when the coalition of both 
revoked users and new joined users try to acquire all the 
session keys that they were unauthorised to. We now state 
the following definitions that model the inside attack. These  
 
definitions are aimed to computational security for session 
key distribution adopting the security model of Liu et al. 
(2003) and Staddon et al. (2002). 
Let 1= { , , }nU U…U  be the universe of the network. We 
assume the availability of a broadcast unreliable channel 
and there is a group manager GM who sets up and performs 
join and revoke operations to maintain a communication 
group, which is a dynamic subset of users of U. Let m be the 
maximum number of sessions, and 2⊂ UR  be a monotone 
decreasing access structure of subsets of users that can be 
revoked by the group manager GM. Let {1, , }i n∈ … , 
{1, , }j m∈ …  and jG ∈U  be the group established by the 
group manager GM in session j. In the following 
definitions, Si denotes the personal secret of user Ui, SKj is 
the session key generated by the GM in session j, Bj is the 
broadcast message by the GM during session j, and Zi,j is the 
information learned by Ui through Bj and Si. 
Definition 5 (Session Key Distribution with Privacy 
(Staddon et al., 2002)):  
1 D is a session key distribution with privacy if 
a for any user i jU G∈ , the session key SKj is 
efficiently determined from Bj and Si 
b for any set jR ⊆ U , where jR ∈R  and i jU R∉ , 
it is computationally infeasible for users in Rj to 
determine the personal key Sj 
c what users 1, , nU U…  learn from Bj cannot be 
determined from broadcasts or personal keys 
alone, i.e. if we consider separately either the set of 
m broadcasts 1{ , , }m…B B  or the set of n personal 
keys 1{ , , }nS S… , then it is computationally 
infeasible to compute session key jSK  (or other 
useful information) from either set.  
2 D has R-revocation capability if given any jR ⊆ U , 
where jR ∈R , the group manager GM can generate a 
broadcast Bj, such that for all i jU R∉ , iU  can efficiently 
recover the session key jSK , but the revoked users 
cannot, i.e. it is computationally infeasible to compute 
jSK  from Bj and { }l U Rl jS ∈ . 
3 D is self-healing if the following is true for any j, 
1 21 < <j j j m≤ ≤ : 
a For any user Ui who is a member in sessions j1 
and j2, the key SKj is efficiently determined by the 
set , ,1 2{ , }i j i jZ Z . In other words, every user 
1i j
U G∈ , who has not been revoked after session 
j1 and before session j2, can recover all session 
keys jSK  for 1 2= , ,j j j… , from the broadcasts 
1j
B  and 
2j
B  where 1 21 <j j m≤ ≤ . 
   
b Let 1 21 < <j j j m≤ ≤ . For any disjoint subsets 
1 2,L L ⊂ U , where 1 2L L∪ ∈R , the set , ,11 1{ }l j U L j jlZ ∈ ≤ ≤ ∪  
, ,2 2
{ }l j U L j j mlZ ∈ ≤ ≤  cannot determine the session key jSK , 
1 2< <j j j , i.e. jSK  cannot be obtained by the 
coalition 1 2L L∪ , where the set 1L  is a coalition of 
users removed before session 1j  and the set 2L  is a 
coalition of users joined from session 2j . 
Definition 6 (R-wise forward and backward secrecy (Liu  
et al., 2003)):  
1 A key distribution scheme D guarantees R-wise 
forward secrecy if for any set jR ⊆ U , where jR ∈R , 
and all s jU R∈  are revoked before session j, it is 
computationally infeasible for the members in jR  
together to get any information about jSK , even with 
the knowledge of group keys 1 1, , jSK SK −…  before 
session j.  
2 A session key distribution D guarantees R-wise 
backward secrecy if for any set jJ ⊆ R , where jJ ∈U , 
and all s jU J∈  join after session j, it is computationally 
infeasible for the members in jJ  together to get any 
information about jSK , even with the knowledge of 
group keys 1, ,j mSK SK+ …  after session j. 
3 Our general construction 
We consider a setting in which there is a group manager (GM) 
and n users 1= { , , }nU U…U . All our operations take place in 
a finite field, ( )GF q , where q is a large prime number 
( >q n ). In our setting, we allow a revoked user to rejoin  
the group in a later session. Let : ( ) ( )GF q GF q→H  be  
a cryptographically secure one-way function. The life of  
the system is divided in sessions = 1,2, ,j m… . The 
communication group in session j is denoted by jG ⊂ U . We 
consider a linear secret sharing scheme realising some access 
structure Γ  over the set U. For simplicity, suppose there exists 
a public function : { } ( )lGM GF qΦ ∪ →U  satisfying the 
property ( ) ( ) : ,i iGM U U B BΦ ∈〈Φ ∈ 〉 ⇔ ∈Γ  where l is a 
positive integer. In other words, the vector ( )GMΦ  can be 
expressed as a linear combination of the vectors in the set 
{ ( ) : }i iU U BΦ ∈  if and only if B is an authorised subset. Then 
Φ  defines Γ  as a vector space access structure. 
Set-up: Let 1G ∈ U . The group manager GM chooses 
independently and uniformly at random m vectors 
1 2, , , ( )
l
mv v v GF q∈… . The group manager randomly picks 
an initial backward key seed ( )BS GF q∈ . It repeatedly 
applies (in the pre-processing time) the one-way function H 
on BS  and computes the one-way backward key chain of 
length m: 
1
1= ( ) = ( )  1 .
B B i B
i iK K S for i m
−
− ≤ ≤H H  
The GM also selects at random m numbers 1, , ( )m GF qβ β ∈…  by 
running a PRNG which is cryptographically secure. The j-th 
session key is computed as 1=
B
j j m jSK Kβ − ++ . 
Unlike the existing self-healing key distribution 
schemes, our setting allows a revoked user to rejoin the 
group in a later session with a new identity. However, we 
make the following restriction on the life cycle of each user 
as determined by the GM. Each user iU  is first assigned a 
prearranged life cycle ( , )i is t , where 1 <i is t m≤ ≤ , by the 
GM, i.e. iU  is involved in = 1i i ik t s− +  sessions and is not 
allowed to revoke before session it , however iU  may get 
offline during its life cycle due to power failure. Self-
healing is needed at this point. Each user iU , for 1 i n≤ ≤ , 
receives its personal secret keys corresponding to the ik  
sessions 2= { . ( ), , . ( ); , , } ( ) kii s i t i s ti i i iS v U v U GF qβ βΦ Φ ∈… …  
from the group manager via the secure communication 
channel between them. Here the operation ‘.’ is the inner 
product modulo q.  
Broadcast: Let jR  be the set of all revoked users for sessions 
in and before j such that jR ∉Γ  and jG  be the set of all non-
revoked users in session j. In the j-th session the GM  
first chooses a subset of users \j jW G⊂ U  with minimal 
cardinality such that 0.j jW R∪ ∈Γ . The GM then computes 
1= . ( )
B
j m j jZ K v GM− + + Φ  and broadcasts the message  
= {( , . ( )) : } { }.j k j k k j j jU v U U W R ZΦ ∈ ∪ ∪B  
Session Key Recovery: When a non-revoked user iU  receives 
the j-th session key distribution message Bj, it recovers 
. ( )jv GMΦ  as follows: Since 0j jW R∪ ∈Γ  is the maximal 
non-authorised subset with minimum cardinality having the 
property \j jW G∈U , the set = { }j j iB W R U∪ ∪ ∈Γ . Thus 
B is an authorised subset, and one can write 
{ : }
( ) = ( )k k
k U Bk
GM U
∈
Φ Λ Φ∑  (1) 
for some ( )k GF qΛ ∈ . Hence iU  knows kΛ  and . ( )j kv UΦ  
for all k B∈  and consequently can compute  
{ : } { : }
( . ( )) = . ( )
= . ( )
k j k j k k
k U B k U Bk k
j
v U v U
v GM
∈ ∈
⎛ ⎞Λ Φ Λ Φ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
Φ
∑ ∑  
Then iU  recovers the key 1
B
m jK − +  as 1 = . ( ).
B
m j j jK Z v GM− + − Φ  
Finally, iU  computes the current session key 1= .
B
j j m jSK Kβ − ++  
  
A user kU  who either does not know its private 
information . ( )j kv UΦ  or who is a revoked user in jR , i.e. 
k j jU W R∈ ∪ , cannot compute . ( )jv GMΦ  because kU  only 
knows values broadcast in the message Bj corresponding to  
an unauthorised subset of the secret sharing scheme. 
Consequently, kU  cannot recover the backward key 1
B
m jK − +  
and hence the j-th session key jSK . 
Add Group Members: When a new user wants to join the 
communication group starting from session j, the user gets in 
touch with the GM. The GM in turn picks an unused identity 
( )GF qθ ∈ , assigns a life cycle ( , )s tθ θ  to the new user with 
=s jθ , computes the personal secret keys corresponding to 
= 1k t sθ θ θ− +  sessions ={ . ( ), , . ( ); , , }s t s tS v U v Uθ θ θθ θ θ θβ βΦ Φ… …  
and gives Sθ to this new group member via the secure 
communication channel between them. 
Figure 1 Generation of one-way forward key chain and distribution of users’ personal secret keys during the Set-up phase of our general 
construction ( ( , )i is t  being iU ’s prearranged life cycle for 1 <i is t m≤ ≤ ) 
 
Figure 2 Broadcast at the j-th session, where k j jU W R∈ ∪  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
4 Self-healing 
We now explain our self-healing mechanism in the above 
constructions: Let iU  be a group member that receives 
session key distribution messages 
1j
B  and 
2j
B  in sessions 
1j  and 2j  respectively, where 1 21 j j≤ ≤ , but not the 
session key distribution message Bj for session j, where 
1 2< <j j j . User iU  can still recover all the lost session 
keys jSK  for 1 2< <j j j  as desired by point 3(a) of 
Definition 5 using the following steps: 
• iU  recovers from the broadcast message 2jB  in session 
2j , the backward key 12
B
m jK − +  and repeatedly apply the 
one-way function H on this and computes the backward 
keys 1
B
m jK − +  for all j, 1 2<j j j≤ . 
• iU  then recovers all the session keys 1= Bj j m jSK Kβ − ++ , 
for 1 2j j j≤ ≤ . 
Note that a user Ui revoked in session j cannot compute the 
backward keys 11
B
m jK − +  for 1 >j j . Moreover, since a user is 
not allowed to revoke before the end of its life cycle, iU  
revoked in j-th session means its life cycle completes at the 
j-th session. Consequently, iU  does not have 1jβ  for 
1 >j j . As a result, revoked users cannot compute the 
subsequent session keys 
1j
SK  for 1 >j j , as desired. This is 
forward secrecy. 
Similarly, a user iU  joined in session j does not have 2jβ  
for 2 <j j , although it can compute the backward keys 
12
B
m jK − +  for 2 <j j . This forbids iU  to compute the previous 
session keys as desired. This is backward secrecy. 
Now we will show that our construction can resist 
collusion required by point 3(b) of Definition 5. Let 
1 21 < <j j j m≤ ≤ . For any disjoint subsets 1 2,L L U⊂ , 
where 1 2| |L L t∪ ≤ , no information about the session key 
jSK , 1 2< <j j j  can be obtained by the coalition 1 2L L∪ , 
where the set 1L  is a coalition of users removed before session 
1j  and the set 2L  is a coalition of users joined from session 
2j . Our constructions satisfy this property as illustrated below. 
Secret information held by users in 1 2L L∪  and broadcasts in 
all the sessions do not get any information about jSK  for 
1 2< <j j j . This is true because in the worst case, the 
coalition knows 1 1 1 11 1= { . ( ), , . ( ); , , }i i j i jS v U v U β β− −Φ Φ… …  
for 1iU L∈ , 2 2={ . ( ), , . ( ); , , ; , , }i j i m i s t j mi iS v U v U β β β βΦ Φ… … …  
for 2iU L∈ , and 1, , m…B B . For each session j , 
1 2 1j j j≤ ≤ − , the coalition can get backward key 1Bm jK − +  
from 2L . However, the session key jSK  is computed from the 
backward key 1
B
m jK − +  and a random number jβ . The coalition 
1 2L L∪  cannot obtain the random numbers jβ  for 
1 2<j j j≤ . Consequently, all the guess for jSK  with 
1 2<j j j≤  are equi-probable. 
5 Complexity 
• Storage overhead: Storage complexity of personal key for 
user iU  with life cycle ( , )i is t  is ( 2) logi it s t q− + +  
bits. 
• Communication overhead: The communication 
bandwidth for key management at the j-th session is 
( 1) logjt q+  bits, where =| |j j jt W R∪ , jR ∉Γ  is the 
set of all revoked users for sessions in and before j and 
\j jW G⊂ U  with minimum cardinality such that 
0j jW R∪ ∈Γ . Here we ignore the communication 
overhead for the broadcast of user identities iU  for 
i j jU W R∈ ∪ , as these identities can be picked from a 
small finite field. In particular, if our scheme is 
obtained from Shamir’s ( , )t n -threshold secret sharing 
scheme that realises access structure defined by 
={ :| | }A A tΓ ⊆ ≥U  by means of polynomial interpolation, 
then communication bandwidth for key management is 
( 1) logt q+  bits.  
• Computation overhead: The computation complexity is 
22( )j jt t+ , where =| |j j jt W R∪ , jR ∉Γ  is the set of 
all revoked users for sessions in and before j and 
\j jW G⊂ U  with minimum cardinality such that 
0j jW R∪ ∈Γ . This is the number of multiplication 
operations needed to recover ( )GMΦ  by using 
equation (1). Considering Shamir’s ( , )t n -threshold 
secret sharing scheme, the computation cost for key 
management is 22( )t t+ , which is essentially the 
number of multiplication operations needed to recover a 
t-degree polynomial by using Lagrange’s interpolation 
formula. 
6 Security analysis 
Theorem 1: Our construction is secure, self-healing session 
key distribution scheme with privacy, R-revocation 
capability with respect to Definition 5 in our security model 
as described in Section 2.5 and achieve R-wise forward and 
backward secrecy with respect to Definition 6 in the model.  
Proof: Our goal is security against coalition of users from 
R. We will show that our construction is computationally 
secure with respect to revoked users under the difficulty of 
inverting one-way function, i.e. for any session j it is 
computationally infeasible for any set of revoked users from 
R before and on session j to compute with non-negligible 
  
probability the session key jSK , given the View consisting 
of personal keys of revoked users, broadcast messages 
before, on and after session j and session keys of revoked 
users before session j. 
Consider a coalition of revoked users from R, say 
jR ∈R , who are revoked on or before the j-th session. The 
revoked users are not entitled to know the j-th session key 
jSK . We can model this coalition of users from R as a 
polynomial-time algorithm A′ that takes View as input and 
outputs its guess for jSK . We say that A′ is successful in 
breaking the construction if it has a non-negligible 
advantage in determining the session key jSK . Then using 
A′, we can construct a polynomial-time algorithm A for 
inverting one-way function H and have the following claim: 
Claim: Assuming a cryptographically secure PRNG, A 
inverts one-way function H with non-negligible probability 
if A′ is successful. 
Proof: Given any instance = ( )y xH  of one-way function H, 
A first generates an instance View for A′ as follows: A 
randomly generates m distinct number 1, , ( )m GF qβ β ∈…  by 
using a cryptographically secure PRNG and constructs the 
following backward key chain by repeatedly applying H on y: 
2 1
1 2 3= , = ( ), = ( ), , = ( ), , =
B B B B j B
j mK y K y K y K y K
−… …H H H 1( ).m y−H  
A computes the j-th session key 1= .Bj j m jSK Kβ − ++  A 
chooses at random m vectors 1, , ( )
l
mv v GF q∈… . For 
1 i n≤ ≤ , each user iU ∈U  with life cycle, say ( , )i is t , 
1 <i is t m≤ ≤  (which is assigned to iU  by A), receives its 
personal secret keys corresponding to the ik  sessions 
2= { . ( ), , . ( ); , , } ( ) kii s i t i s ti i i iS v U v U GF qβ βΦ Φ ∈… …  from A 
via the secure communication channel between them. 
In this setting, = 2 \UΓ R  is a monotone increasing 
access structure of authorised users over U. Γ  is determined 
by the family of minimal qualified subsets, 0Γ , which is 
called the basis of Γ . Now jR ∈R  implies jR ∉Γ . 
Let jG  be the set of all non-revoked users in session j. 
At the j-th session, A chooses a subset of users \j jW G⊂ U  
with minimal cardinality such that 0j jW R∪ ∈Γ . A then 
computes broadcast message Bj for = 1, ,j m…  as:  
= {( , . ( )) : } { },j k j k k j j jU v U U W R ZΦ ∈ ∪ ∪B  
where 1= . ( ).
B
j m j jZ K v GM− + + Φ  Then A sets View as  
1 1
1 1
. ( )    = 1, , ;
  = 1, , ;
=
, , ;
, ,
s k k j
j
j
j
v U for all U R and s m
for j m
View
SK SK
β β −
−
Φ ∈⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
…
…
…
…
B
 
A gives View to A′, which in turn selects , ( )jX GF qβ ′ ∈  
randomly, sets the j-th session key to be =j jSK Xβ′ ′ +  and 
returns jSK ′  to A. A checks whether =j jSK SK′ . If not, A 
chooses a random ( )x GF q′∈  and outputs x′ . 
Note that from View, A′ knows { . ( ) : ,j k k j jv U U W RΦ ∈ ∪  
1 } { . ( ) : ,s k k jj m v U U R≤ ≤ ∪ Φ ∈  1 }s m≤ ≤ , 1 1, , jβ β −…  
and at most 1j −  session keys 1 1, , jSK SK −… . Consequently A′ 
has knowledge of at most 1j−  backward keys 2, ,B Bm m jK K − +… . 
Observe that =j jSK SK′  provided  
1 the guess jβ ′  of A′ for jβ  is correct; and  
2 A′ knows the backward key 1Bm jK − + .  
The condition 1 occurs if either of the following two holds:  
• A′ is able to choose ( )j GF qβ ′ ∈  so that =j jβ β′ , the 
probability of which is 1/ q  (negligible for large q).  
• A′ is able to generate jβ ′  from View. Note that from 
View, A′ knows 1 1, , ( )j GF qβ β − ∈… . Observe that 
1 1, , jβ β −…  are generated by a cryptographically secure 
PRNG. Thus if A′ is able to generate jβ ′  from the 
known random numbers 1 1, , jβ β −… , then the PRNG is 
insecure, leading to a contradiction.  
The condition 2 occurs if either of the following two holds: 
• A′ is able to compute the . ( )jv GMΦ  from View and 
consequently can recover the backward key 1
B
m jK − +  as 
follows: 1 = . ( ).
B
m j j jK Z v GM− + − Φ  From View, A′ knows 
{ . ( ) : ,1 } { . ( ) :j k k j j s k kv U U W R j m v U UΦ ∈ ∪ ≤ ≤ ∪ Φ ∈
,1 }jR s m≤ ≤ , where \j jW G⊂ U  has minimal 
cardinality with 0j jW R∪ ∈Γ  and will not be able to 
compute . ( )jv GMΦ  by the property of Φ . Observe that 
. ( )jv GMΦ  is linear combination of { . ( ) : }j k kv U U BΦ ∈  
if and only if B∈Γ . Consequently, A′ will not be able to 
recover 1
B
m jK − +  from Bj as described above.  
• 'A  is able to choose ( )X GF q∈  so that the following 
relations hold:  
1
2
1
2
= ( )
= ( )
= ( )
B j
m
B j
m
B
m j
K X
K X
K X
−
−
−
− +
#
H
H
H
 
This occurs with a non-negligible probability only if A is 
able to invert the one-way function H. In that case, A 
returns 1= ( )x y−H .  
  
The above arguments show that if A′ is successful in 
breaking the security of our construction, then A is able to 
invert the one-way function. 
Hence our construction is computationally secure under 
the hardness of inverting one-way function and the security 
of the PRNG. This is forward secrecy. We can also prove 
the computational security for backward secrecy of our 
construction using the similar arguments as above 
considering a coalition of new joined users. The only 
difference in the proof is that this coalition of new users 
joined in and after session j knows all the backward keys, 
but they do not know 1 1, , jβ β −…  and consequently are 
unable to compute the past session keys they were 
unauthorised to. 
We will now show that our construction satisfies all the 
conditions required by Definition 5. 
1 (a) Session key efficiently recovered by a non-revoked user 
iU  is described in the third step of our construction.  
(b) For any set jR ⊆ U , jR ∈R , and any non-revoked user 
i jU R∉ , we show that the coalition Rj knows nothing 
about the personal secret = ( . ( ), , . ( ), , .i s i j i ti iS v U v U vΦ Φ… …  
( ); , , , , )i s j ti iU β β βΦ … …  of iU  with life cycle ( , )i is t , 
1 i is t m≤ ≤ ≤  . For any session j, iU  uses . ( )j iv UΦ  and 
jβ ′  as its personal secret. Since the coalition jR ∉Γ , the 
values { . ( ) : ,1 }s k k jv U U R s mΦ ∈ ≤ ≤  is not enough to 
compute . ( )j iv UΦ  by the property of Φ . Moreover, the 
coalition Rj may at most learn 1 1, , jβ β −…  and the 
probability of Rj to guess jβ ′  is negligible under the 
security of cryptographically secure PRNG. So it is 
computationally infeasible for coalition Rj to learn 
. ( )j iv UΦ  for i jU R∉ .  
(c) The session key jSK  for the j-th session is computed 
from two parts: backward key 1
B
m jK − +  and random 
number jβ ′  where jβ ′  are parts of personal key 
received from GM before or when it joins the session 
group and 1 = . ( )
B
m j j jK Z v GM− + − Φ  is recovered from 
the broadcast message Bj. So the personal secret keys 
alone do not give any information about any session 
key. Since the initial backward seed BS  is chosen 
randomly, the backward key 1
B
m jK − +  and consequently 
the session key jSK  is random as long as 
BS , 
1 2 2, , ,
B B B
m jK K K − +…  are not get revealed. This in turn 
implies that the broadcast messages alone cannot leak 
any information about the session keys. So it is 
computationally infeasible to determine ,i jZ  from only 
personal key iS  or broadcast message Bj.  
2 (R-revocation property) Let jR ⊆ U , where jR ∈R , 
collude in session j. It is impossible for coalition Rj to  
learn the j-th session key jSK  because the knowledge 
of jSK  implies the knowledge of either the backward 
key 1
B
m jK − +  or Bj or the knowledge of the personal 
secret . ( )j iv UΦ  of user i jU R∉ . The coalition Rj 
knows the set { . ( ) : ,1 }s k k jv U U R s mΦ ∈ ≤ ≤ , which is 
not enough to compute . ( )j iv UΦ  by the property of 
Φ . Hence the coalition Rj cannot recover . ( )j iv UΦ , 
which in turn makes 1
B
m jK − +  appears random to all users 
in Rj. Moreover the coalition knows at most 1 1, , jβ β −…  
and guessing jβ ′  is negligible under the security of 
PRNG. Therefore, jSK  is completely safe to Rj from 
computation point of view. 
3 (a) (Self-healing property) From the third step of our 
construction, any user iU  that is a member in sessions 
1j  and 2j  ( 1 21 <j j≤ ), can recover the backward key 
12
B
m jK − +  and hence can obtain the sequence of backward 
keys 
1
, ,Bm jK − …  22
B
m jK − +  by repeatedly applying H on 
12
B
m jK − + . User iU  also holds 1 11 2, ,j jβ β+ −… . Hence, as 
shown in Section 3, user iU  can efficiently recover all 
missed session keys. 
(b) Our construction can also resist R-wise collusion. Let 
1 21 < <j j j m≤ ≤  and let 1 2,L L ∈U  be two disjoint 
subsets, where 1L  is a set of revoked users from the 
group before 1j  and 2L  is a set of users who join the 
group from session 2j . Consider a coalition from 
1 2L L∪ ∈R . We show the users in 1 2L L∪  together 
are not entitled to know the j -th session key jSK  for 
any 1 2< 1j j j≤ − . We can model this coalition of 
users 1 2L L∪  as a polynomial-time algorithm A′ that 
takes View  as input and outputs its guess for jSK . We 
say that A′ is successful in breaking the construction if 
it has a non-negligible advantage in determining the 
session key jSK . 
A first generates the instance View for A′ as follows:  
1 2
1 11 2
1 11 2
. ( )    = 1, , ;
  = 1, , ;
;=
{ , , } { , , };
{ , , } { , , }
s k k
j
B
j j m
j j m
v U U L L and s m
for j m
SView
SK SK SK SK
β β β β−
−
Φ ∀ ∈ ∪⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪∪⎪ ⎪∪⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
…
…
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… …
B
 
A gives View to A′ which in turn selects ( )j GF qβ ′ ∈  
randomly, sets the j-th session key to be 1=
B
j j m jSK Kβ′ ′ − ++ , 
and returns jSK ′  to A. A checks whether =j jSK SK′ . If not, 
A chooses a random ( )x GF q′∈  and outputs x′ . 
  
A′ can compute the j-th backward key 11 = ( )B m j Bm jK H S− +− +  
because it knows BS  from View for =1, ,j m… . Note that 
from View, A′ knows random numbers 1 11 2{ , , } { , , }j j mβ β β β− ∪… …  
and session keys 1 1 2{ , , } { , , }j j mSK SK SK SK∪… … . Observe 
that =j jSK SK′  provided A′ knows the random jβ ′ , which 
occurs if either of the following two conditions hold:  
• A′ is able to choose ( )j GF qβ ′ ∈  so that =j jβ β′ , the 
probability of which is 1/ q  (negligible for large q).  
• A′ is able to generate jβ ′  from View. Note that from 
View, A′ knows 1 11 2{ , , } { , , }j j mβ β β β− ∪… …  which are 
generated by a cryptographically secure PRNG. Thus if 
A′ is able to generate jβ ′  from the known random 
numbers 1 11 2{ , , } { , , }j j mβ β β β− ∪… … , then the PRNG 
is insecure, leading to a contradiction.  
The above arguments show that if A′ is successful in breaking 
the security of our construction, then the PRNG used to 
generate the random numbers by A is insecure. Hence our 
construction is computationally secure for resisting R-coalition 
under the assumption that the PRNG is cryptographically secure. 
We will show that our construction satisfies all the 
conditions required by Definition 6. 
1 (R-wise forward secrecy) Let jR ⊆ U , where R∈R  
and all user s jU R∈  are revoked before the current 
session j. The coalition Rj cannot get any information 
about the current session key jSK  even with the 
knowledge of group keys before session j. This is because 
of the fact that in order to know jSK , any user s jU R∈  
needs to know either . ( )jv GMΦ  or 1Bm jK − +  or jβ ′ . 
Determining . ( )jv GMΦ  requires knowledge of values 
{ . ( ):   j k kv U U B for someΦ ∈  }B∈Γ . But the coalition jR  
knows only the values { . ( ) : }j s s jv U U RΦ ∈  which is 
insufficient as jR ∉Γ . Hence Rj is unable to compute 
jSK . Besides, because of the one-way property of H, it is 
computationally infeasible to compute 
1
B
jK  from 2
B
jK  for 
1 2<j j . The users in Rj might know the sequence of 
backward keys 2, ,
B B
m m jK K − +… , but cannot compute 1Bm jK − +  
and consequently jSK  from this sequence. Hence our 
construction is R-wise forward secure. Moreover the 
coalition knows at most 1 1, , jβ β −…  and guessing jβ ′  is 
negligible under the security of PRNG. 
2 (R-wise backward secrecy) Let jJ ⊆ U , where jJ ∈R  
and all user s jU J∈  join after the current session j. The 
coalition jJ  can not get any information about any 
previous session key 
1j
SK  for 1j j≤  even with the 
knowledge of group keys after session j. This is because  
of the fact that in order to know 
1j
SK , any user s jU J∈  
requires the knowledge of 
1j
β . Now when a new member 
vU  joins the group starting from session 1j + , the  
GM gives vU  at most 1, ,j mβ β+ … , together with the 
values 21= ( . ( ), , . ( )) ( )
m j
v j v m vS v U v U GF q
− +
+ Φ Φ ∈… . Hence it 
is computationally infeasible for the newly joined member 
to trace back for previous 
1j
β  under the security of  
PRNG for 1j j≤ . Consequently, our protocol is R-wise 
backward secure. In fact, this backward secrecy is 
independent of R. 
7 Comparison 
The storage overhead, communication complexity and 
computation cost of each user in our construction is 
provided in Section 5. The existing works to deal with self-
healing key distribution using monotone decreasing family 
of revoked subset of users instead of monotone decreasing 
threshold structure are Dutta et al. (2008) and Saez (2004). 
In contrast to the family of the self-healing key distribution 
schemes proposed by Saez (2004), our general construction 
uses a different self-healing approach based on Dutta et al. 
(2008) which is more efficient in terms of computation and 
communication, yielding a family of more flexible self-
healing key distribution schemes that can provide better 
properties. Unlike Saez (2004), the length of the broadcast 
message in our scheme does not depend on the history of 
revoked subsets of users to perform self-healing. This 
feature provides significant reduction in the communication 
cost, which is one of the main improvement of our scheme 
over the previous works (Staddon et al., 2002; Liu et al., 
2003; Blundo et al., 2004; Hong and Kang, 2005). For 
simplicity, we compare a special case of our construction 
with the other similar schemes considering Shamir’s ( , )t n -
threshold secret sharing. 
If we consider a secret sharing scheme realising a 
specific bipartite access structure defined in the set of users, 
the previous self-healing mechanisms (Staddon et al., 2002; 
Liu et al., 2003; Blundo et al., 2004; Hong and Kang, 2005) 
allow to improve the efficiency of revocations of a small 
number of users, say less than j, for some positive integer 
1j t≤ − , t is the threshold on the number of revoked users. 
This is because of the fact that in all the previous self-
healing key distribution schemes, a part of the broadcast 
message of every session contains a history of revoked 
subsets of users in order to perform self-healing. This part 
of broadcast message has a proportional amount of 
information to 1t −  in all the previous self-healing key 
distribution schemes, despite only two or three users must 
be revoked. We overcome this overhead on broadcast 
message length in our general construction since our self-
healing mechanism does not need to send any such history. 
  
To be more precise, let us use the bipartite access 
structure Γ  in Example 3 of Section 2, which cannot be 
realised by a vector space secret sharing (except in the 
threshold case = 1j t − ), but by a linear one in which each 
participant is associated with two vectors instead of one. 
Each operation will have twice the cost of the same 
operation in the threshold case. In particular, the length of 
the personal keys is twice the length in the threshold case. 
This scheme is useful in case the efficiency in the revocation 
of small subsets has priority. Implementing this using our self-
healing key distribution reduces communication overhead 
significantly as compared to the previous schemes. 
Table 2 shows comparisons of different self-healing 
schemes in terms of storage, communication and computation, 
where =jT t  if the access structure is realised by Shamir’s  
(t, n) -threshold secret sharing scheme. In one hand,  
 
 
our construction reduces the communication complexity 
(bandwidth) to ( )O t , whereas optimal communication 
complexity achieved by the previous schemes is ( )O tj  at the  
j-th session. On the other hand, we achieve less computation 
cost. For a user iU  at the j-th session, the computation cost is 
incurred by recovering all previous session keys up to the  
j-th session (worst case) by self-healing mechanism. The 
communication complexity and computation cost in our 
constructions do not increase as the number of session grows. 
These are the most prominent improvement of our schemes 
over the previous self-healing key distributions (Staddon et al., 
2002; Liu et al., 2003; Blundo et al., 2004; Hong and Kang, 
2005). Figures 3 and 4 respectively show the comparative 
summary of communication and computation costs of our 
scheme with the existing self-healing key distribution schemes 
for = 50j  with = 100m  and = 67q .  
Table 2 Comparison among different self-healing key distribution schemes in j-th session ( = 1i i ik t s− + , where ( , )i is t  is the life cycle 
assigned to user iU  by the GM; jT  is a threshold on the number of revoked users which depend on the monotone decreasing 
access structure; and t is the maximum number of revoked users) 
Schemes Storage Overhead Communication Overhead Computation Overhead 
Staddon et al., 2002 2( 1) logm j q− +  2( 2 )logmt mt m t q+ + +  22 3mt mt t+ −  
Liu et al., 2003 2( 1)logm j q− +  [( 1) ( 1)]logm j t m q+ + + +  2mt t tj j+ + +  
Blundo et al., 2004 ( 1)logm j q− +  (2 )logtj j q+  22 ( )j t t+  
Hong and Kang, 2005 ( 1)logm j q− +  ( 1) logtj j t q+ − −  2tj j+  
Dutta et al., 2008 ( 2) logm j q− +  ( 1)logjT q+  22( )j jT T+  
Our Construction  ( 1) logik q+  ( 1)logjT q+  22( )j jT T+  
Figure 3 Comparison of communication bandwidth with = 100m , = 67q  and = 50j  (see online version for colours) 
 
  
Figure 4 Comparison of computation overhead with = 100m , = 67q  and = 50j  (see online version for colours) 
 
 
As mentioned earlier, our construction is also based on Dutta  
et al. (2008). However, we have the following subtle differences: 
(a) No forward key chain is used in our construction unlike 
Dutta et al. (2008). 
(b) In contrary to Dutta et al. (2008), each user iU  in our 
construction is pre-assigned a life cycle ( , )i is t  by the 
GM. This means user iU  can participate in = 1i i ik t s− +  
sessions and cannot revoke before session it  is over. 
Consequently, the GM no longer need to use computation-
intensive traitor tracing techniques to keep track of 
compromised users to perform revocation. 
(c) In contrast to Dutta et al. (2008), we have been able to 
resist collusion attack in our constructions by using pre-
selected random numbers 1, , mβ β…  (fixed) as part of 
users’ secret keys. A user iU  with life cycle ( , )i is t  is 
given only = 1i i ik t s− +  values . ( ), , . ( )s i t ii iv U v UΦ Φ…  
and the additional values , ,s ti iβ β…  as part of its secret 
key by the GM via a secure communication channel 
between them at the initial set-up. As compared to 
Dutta et al. (2008), we get increased storage for our 
scheme if 1>
2i
m jk − + . The communication and 
computation costs for our scheme are the same as in 
Dutta et al. (2008). 
(d) Unlike previous self-healing key distribution schemes, 
revoked users may join at later sessions with new 
identities without violating any security. 
Let us now note down a few points in the following remarks. 
Remark 1: We assume that the number of sessions (m) is 
fixed. The system fails when all m sessions are exhausted or 
the set of revoked users for sessions in and before the 
current session becomes an element of Γ  for our general 
construction. Once the parameters associated with the 
sessions are run out, a new set-up process needs to be 
carried out. The number of sessions m may be chosen large 
enough to prevent re-initialisation if the users have no 
storage constraints. But the communication bandwidth and 
computation for key management grows linearly with the 
size of the set of revoked users R. So | |R  cannot be too 
large in order to eliminate re-initialisation. However, this is 
a common problem with all the existing self-healing key 
distribution schemes with R-revocation. 
Remark 2: The broadcast message Bj in the j-th session 
contains IDs (or indices of IDs) of (revoked) users. There is 
no privacy issue while broadcasting these valid user IDs to 
the network. We ignore the communication overhead for the 
broadcast of the set of IDs, because user IDs can be selected 
from a small finite field (Hong and Kang, 2005).  
Remark 3. We emphasise that during the set-up phase, the 
personal secret keys of each user corresponding to m 
sessions and corresponding jβ ’s (generated by running a 
PRNG) associated with user’s pre-assigned life cycle are 
delivered by the GM  to the corresponding user through a 
secure communication channel between them. The same is 
done while a new user joins the group. For instance, in case 
of a pay TV channel, a subscriber may obtain a set top box 
from the cable operator (GM) during its registration (set-up) 
phase, which stores the secret values corresponding to this 
subscriber. 
   
Remark 4. As in the existing self-healing key distribution 
schemes, we also consider a typical wireless ad hoc network 
with a fixed group manager, instead of a general one 
without group managers and the revoked users are never 
allowed to rejoin the group. There are several special 
applications with this type of set-up. We handle key 
management in this set-up and incorporate self-healing and 
revocation (up to a threshold value t) properties with 
reduced overheads. This is by no means a trivial task. The 
idea of using secret sharing or revocation polynomial in 
designing key distribution schemes is not new in the 
literature. Our contribution is in introducing an interesting 
anti-collusive self-healing mechanism by applying one way 
functions which is effective in saving overheads and 
assigning pre-selected life cycle to each user during its set-
up. One point not discussed above is how to handle the 
situation where all session parameters have been consumed 
and a node has no idea about the situation and wants  
to return to an old session. We may control this using 
session identities which are session specific and may be 
implemented by keeping a counter by each node. The 
counter is incremented by the node when a new session 
starts and the node is not revoked yet. 
Remark 5. The group manager decides when a user should 
get revoked from the system. A user may get malicious any 
time during a legitimate session. Unless the group manager 
detects this fact, the user cannot be revoked by the group 
manager from the system. Thus the group manager has to 
keep track of compromised users using some special 
treatment such as traitor tracing, which might be expensive. 
The risk still remains in the system to have a malicious user 
until the group manager detects certain misbehaviour of the 
user. This is a common problem with all the existing self-
healing key distribution schemes. In our pre-arranged life-
cycle based approach, there is no need for the group 
manager to use expensive traitor tracing algorithms in 
handling compromised nodes. The selection of a user’s life 
cycle is pre-determined by the group manager. The group 
manager believes that a user behaves honestly and will not 
get compromised during its life cycle. In our setting, the 
group manager pre-selects the session of revocation for a 
user during user’s set-up phase by assigning the user a pre-
arranged life cycle. The user is revoked from the system by 
the group manager once its life cycle is over irrespective of 
user gets compromised or not. The joining session can be 
selected by the user. Our designs allow a revoked user to 
join at a later session with new identity and a new life cycle 
starting from its new joining session. 
Remark 6. Our security model addresses the inside attacks 
only and the security analysis of our scheme is in this 
security framework. However, additional security measures 
should be provided for the group manager to block the 
intruders from compromising it, thereby preventing the 
group manager itself to fail under attack. One of the ways to 
counter such an event is frequent changing of the group 
manager. Many practical applications of sensor networks 
require their cluster head roles to be undertaken by different  
 
nodes at different time instants (though the aim is mainly to 
conserve energy). Thus the activities of each such manager 
node can be voted upon by the remaining members, and  
the re-assignment of the node to the manager position is 
contingent on receiving at least a threshold number of votes. 
Thus, the damage caused to the network can be minimised 
over long evaluation times, and in the asymptotic case, the 
malicious group manager will soon be disallowed from 
resuming the governing activity over the network. It is an 
open challenge to identify the interval in which member 
votes can be counted, given the healing time of a proposed 
method. We shall study this further in future work. 
8 Conclusion 
We introduce the collusion resistance property to the 
generalised self-healing key distribution proposed by Dutta 
et al. (2008) using a pre-arranged life-cycle based approach. 
Our set-up allows each user to choose its joining session  
at its will, but the session for its revocation is pre-selected 
by the group manager. In contrast to polynomial based 
schemes, our scheme has realised a general monotone 
decreasing access structure for the family of subsets that can 
be revoked instead of a threshold one. This provides more 
flexible performance for self-healing key distribution and 
would suit various wireless network environments. Several 
innovative business models allow contractual subscription 
or rental by the service provider for the scalability of 
business and do not allow the user to revoke before its 
contract is terminated. Our pre-determined life cycle based 
key distribution scheme is suitable for such applications. 
The proposed scheme provides better efficiency in 
communication and storage as compared to the existing 
approaches. Most important of all, our scheme can resist 
collusion between the newly joined users and the revoked 
users besides forward and backward secrecy. The scheme 
has been properly analysed in an appropriate security model 
and is proven to be computationally secure. Moreover, 
rejoining of revoked users can be done in our scheme at 
later sessions with new identities without compromising 
security, unlike the existing self-healing schemes.  
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